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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an econ-
omy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships,
that is, an entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual of-
fer. Several homogeneous lenders compete on the contracts they offer to finance the
entrepreneur’s investment project. We model a common agency game with moral
hazard, and we characterize its equilibria. As expected, notwithstanding the competi-
tion among the principals (lenders), non-competitive allocations can be supported. In
particular, positive profit equilibria are pervasive. We then provide a complete charac-
terization of the constrained utility possibility set, and observe that all the equilibrium
payoffs of the decentralized game belong to the frontier of the set. Hence, all credit
market equilibria turn out to be constrained Pareto efficient.
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1 Introduction
The paper is devoted to the analysis of credit markets where several lenders strategi-
cally compete over the contracts they offer to entrepreneur-borrowers. At the stage of
contracting, the decision of the unique borrower crucially depends on the loans she is si-
multaneously receiving from all the lenders of the economy. We consider a set-up where
the contracts are non-exclusive, i.e. the borrower is allowed to accept more than one
contract at a time. The main aim of the work is to emphasize the interplay of contrac-
tual externalities in determining the welfare properties of the equilibria arising in such
framework.
Exclusivity clauses are not explicitly imposed in several financial relationships. It is
recognized that many firms have access to multiple credit sources, as shown by Petersen
and Rajan (1995) for the small firms in the U.S., or by Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso
(2000) for the Italian case. The credit card market has been proposed as an example of
non-exclusive dealings, as Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Parlour and Rajan (2001) have
already explained. Examples of financial interactions with non-exclusive contracting which
aim at clarifying the relationship between incentives and competition are very recent: the
main general results and implications are discussed by Segal and Whinston (2003).
The relevant finding of the literature on non-exclusivity can be summarized as follows:
the contractual externalities emerging when several principals interact with one common
agent, can be responsible for existence of second-best inefficient equilibria. In other words,
a social planner who is subject to incentive constraints and feasibility can achieve outcomes
that Pareto dominate the equilibrium outcomes of players’ interactions.
Constrained inefficient equilibria have mostly been analyzed in insurance set-ups (Arnott
and Stiglitz (1993), Hellwig (1983), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) and Bisin and Guaitoli
(2004)). The present essay proposes an investigation on the welfare properties of equilibria
in the credit market, where strategic competition is over financial contracts.
The theoretical contributions examining credit market imperfections mostly use the
principal-agent model as a tool to represent credit relationships. The solution to the
principal-agent model is equivalent to the outcome of a planner’s maximization problem
under exclusive contracting and subject to the same asymmetry of information, given
appropriate welfare weights. Hence, every equilibrium of the principal-agent contracting
game turns out to be second-best efficient.
Enriching the analysis of competition in the credit market using the common agency
approach to financial contracting, we believe is a necessary step to analyze competition
on financial markets and the welfare properties of the equilibria of the new game. This
work could then be regarded as part of a research project on welfare foundations for policy
intervention, in particular along the lines of the credit channel of monetary policy.
We propose a simple, static and partial equilibrium model of the credit market to
study multiple credit relationships. We model competition between an arbitrarily large
and finite number of lenders who offer credit lines to a single borrower. The borrower has
to take some non-observable action; she can choose not to perform the hidden action and
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to divert resources for private use, in which case she will appropriate a fixed proportion
of the received liquidity.1 By exerting effort in the investment project, she will get some
stochastic returns from the production technology. None of the lender is irrelevant, in the
sense that every proposed loan affects the entrepreneur on the effort she will choose.
The possibility to sign several contracts simultaneously generates externalities among
the financiers. These externalities are responsible for the emergence of equilibrium results
which are not in line with Bertrand theory of competition. If the agency costs are high
enough, competition among financiers delivers non-competitive results in the forms of
credit rationing and of positive extra-profits at equilibrium.
The model is closely related to the Parlour and Rajan (2001)’s work on the credit cards
market, which we regard as a useful benchmark to provide insights on the emergence of
positive profit equilibria. We modified their analysis, generalizing their incentive structure.
As a result, we are able to provide (in a richer set-up) the same equilibrium characterization
as Parlour and Rajan (2001).
The main contribution of this work relies, though, on the welfare analysis of the credit
market equilibria. Examining this issue, we show that every positive-profit equilibrium
is constrained Pareto efficient, i.e. it would be the outcome of the decision of a central
authority subject to the same informational constraints. The result is not in line with
the main findings of the existing literature on competition and incentives, which has
always emphasized that non-exclusive contracting generates those externalities sustaining
constrained inefficient outcomes.2
Our simple example clarifies how could the incentive structure eliminate the (con-
strained) inefficiency result. The crucial element turns out to be the existence of a binding
Incentive Compatibility constraint in the credit market equilibrium. This guarantees that
every equilibrium outcome can in fact be obtained as the solution of a planner’s problem.
In particular, the feasible sets of the two problems result to be the same.
Surprisingly, the same argument applies to the recent literature on insurance markets
with non-exclusive contracting. Removing the assumption of risk-averse agents in the
framework of Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) implies that
their positive profits equilibria (which were the inefficient ones) will correspond to binding
incentive constraints, and collapse to allocations on the second-best frontier. While in
insurance contexts it is widely accepted that the customer be risk-averse, in a lender-
borrower interaction this assumption has often been relaxed.3
The discussion is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the features of
our set-up. Section 3 characterizes the credit market equilibria of a simplified version of
the model. Section 4 provides the welfare analysis and the results on the efficiency of the
positive-profit equilibria as compared to those obtained in the insurance set-ups. Section
5 presents a discussion of our results. The Appendix presents the general version of our
credit economy and contains all the proofs.
1This model is indeed compatible with the literature on strategic default. For a detailed justification
of such an approach to strategic default, refer to Parlour and Rajan (2001).
2See Arnott and Stiglitz (1993), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), Segal and
Whinston (2003).
3See for example, Parlour and Rajan (2001) or Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
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2 The model
Credit relationships are represented in a simple way. In this economy there are N ≥ 2
lenders (indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., N}) who compete over the loan contracts to finance
a single borrower.4 The entrepreneur is penniless though she has access to the technology
for the production of the only existing good. Contractual offers are simultaneous. Having
received all the contract’s proposals, the borrower decides which of them to sign taking
into account that she can accept any subset of them.5
The production process is stochastic and the probability distribution over the random
outcomes is determined by the entrepreneur’s choice on a non-contractible action (effort).
The entrepreneur’s effort space is made of two elements: eH and eL, with eH > eL. If
the high effort eH is chosen, production successfully yields G(I) for every I invested with
probability p and 0 with probability 1− p. If, on the contrary, the low effort eL is taken,
the entrepreneur’s activity is unsuccessful with probability 1.
Exerting effort implies some disutility for the borrower. We chose to represent this
feature using a private benefit function ψ(e), which takes values ψ(eH) = 0 and ψ(eL) =
B(I). The private benefit function B(I) is taken to be continuous, increasing and convex:
B(0) = 0, B′(I) > 0, B′′(I) ≥ 0,
and such to satisfy the Inada conditions:
lim
I→0
B′(I) = 0, and lim
I→∞
B′(I) = +∞.
Once should hence notice that we are considering the set of outcomes Y = {G(I), 0}.
The private choice of effort affects the probability distribution of these realizations. In
particular, if the entrepreneur exerts the high effort eH , the probability vector is given
by the array: {p, 1− p} with p > 0. If instead the entrepreneur shirks, i.e. chooses low
effort eL, the lottery is degenerate and equal to: {0, 1}. The production function G(I) is
continuous, increasing and strictly concave in I. Inada conditions are also satisfied.
Let us describe the normal form of the game we are considering. Lenders strategically
compete over financial contracts. The strategy of each lender i is the choice of the contract
Ci. The contract offer Ci prescribes a repayment line Ri and a loan amount Ii, i.e.
Ci = (Ri, Ii) ∈ Ci ⊆ R2+
4Abusing notation we indicate the set of lenders and its cardinality with N .
5This defines a scenario of delegated common agency Martimort and Stole (2003)
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where Ci is the set of feasible contract offers for each lender i. We also denote C = ×iCi
the aggregate set of offered contracts.6 The borrower’s strategy is therefore given by the
map:
sb : C → {0, 1}N ×
{
eH , eL
}
With a small abuse of notation, we also define the generic element of the set {0, 1}N as
the array ab =
(
a1b , a
2
b , ..., a
N
b
)
, where aib = {0, 1} is the borrower’s decision of rejecting or
accepting lender i’s offer. The choice of the array ab defines the set of accepted contracts
A:
A = {i ∈ N : aib = 1}
In other words, the borrower decides on the choice of the effort level and on the relevant
set of offers to accept A. Her strategy set will be denoted as Sb, so that sb ∈ Sb.
Let us now consider payoffs. The borrower’s payoff is given by:
pib =
{
p [G(I)−R] if eH is chosen
BI if eL is chosen
where R and I denote the aggregate repayment and investment, respectively:
R =
∑
i∈A
Ri and I =
∑
i∈A
Ii.
Lender i’s payoff is given by:
pii =
{
pRi − (1 + r)Ii if Ci is accepted
0 otherwise
where r ∈ R + is the lender’s cost of collecting deposits.7
One has also to notice that lender i’s payoff does not directly depend on lender j’s
strategies. Existence of contractual externalities among lenders is originated by the bor-
rower’s behavior only: at the stage of contracting with lender i, the action chosen by the
borrower depends on the contractual offer she is receiving from lender j.8
If low effort is chosen, the limited liability assumption guarantees that the entrepre-
neur will have no appropriable resources to repay the loan. The only way to give him a
6One should notice that lenders’ strategy are restricted to be take-it or leave-it offers. When Common
Agency games of complete information are considered, it is well known that this restriction on principals’
strategy spaces involves a loss of generality. If principals are allowed to offer menus over the relevant
alternatives, there can be equilibrium outcomes that could not be supported by simple offers (see Peters
(2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002). There is, anyway, always a rationale for the use of take-it or
leave-it offers: Peters (2003) shows that every equilibrium outcome of this simple game continues to be an
equilibrium outcome of the extended game where principals are competing over menus.
7Lenders here rely on the deposit market to finance entrepreneurial activity.
8This is usually referred to as the absence of direct externalities among principals. Most common
agency models have been developed in such a simplified scenario. Examples of recent researches where
direct externalities among principals are considered include Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Martimort
and Stole (2003).
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positive repayment will be to induce the entrepreneur to perform high effort. In particular,
whenever the low effort is chosen, each lender i will earn the negative profit:
pii = −(1 + r)Ii
We model credit market interactions as a sequential game, with a first stage where
several lenders play a simultaneous move game and a second stage where the borrower
decides on acceptance/rejection of each offer and finally exerts effort. In formal terms,
loan relationships are represented by the following complete information common agency
game Γ:
Γ = {(pii)i∈N , pib, C,Sb} .
3 Credit market equilibria
This section discusses the properties of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game Γ.
The equilibria match those discussed by Parlour and Rajan (2001). Importantly, we are
able to show that the specific characterization obtained in Parlour and Rajan (2001) can
in fact be reproduced in a more general setting, where the private benefit earned by the
single agent is taken to be a non-linear function of the amount borrowed I.
The discussion of this general case is proposed in the Appendix (that contains all the
proofs), while the paragraphs present the simpler case with B(I) = BI with B > 0. This
scenario indeed simply reformulates the original Parlour and Rajan (2001) model in a
moral hazard setting and introduces a positive interest rate on deposits. Having presented
the equilibria of the credit market we then characterize the constrained Pareto frontier
of the economy, and to show that competition among lenders sustains here only second-
best efficient allocations (equilibria). We start by remarking that whenever the effort eL
chosen, then every active lender earns negative profits. As a consequence, at equilibrium
only the high level of effort will be implemented. Furthermore, since the entrepreneur’s
private benefit is taken to be monotonically increasing in the aggregate lending I, then
the borrower always has the incentive to accept the whole array of offered contracts when
eL is selected. This greatly simplifies the incentive analysis.
We choose Subgame Perfection as the relevant equilibrium concept for the game Γ.
Definition 1 A (pure strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ is an array
[(
R˜i, I˜i
)
i∈N
, (a˜ib)i∈N , p
]
such that:
• the borrower is optimally choosing the set of accepted contracts A ( i.e. she is choosing
her optimal array ab ∈ {0, 1}N ) and implementing the high level of effort;
• for every lender i ∈ N , the pair
(
R˜i, I˜i
)
is a solution to the following problem:
max
Ri,Ii
pRi − (1 + r)Ii
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s.t.
p
G
∑
j 6=i
I˜j a˜
j
b + Iia˜
i
b
−
∑
j 6=i
R˜j a˜
j
b +Ria˜
i
b
 ≥ B
 N∑
j=1
I˜j a˜
j
b + Iia˜
i
b
 (1)
The inequality (1) is the borrower’s Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint and it is
formulated in terms of aggregate investment and aggregate revenues. The borrower has no
endowment, her exogenous reservation utility is taken to be zero and thus her participation
decision will always be satisfied. The constraint (1) hence defines lender i’s set of feasible
contracts under non-exclusivity.
We also remark that the aggregate surplus corresponding to the choice of eH corre-
sponds to S = pib+
∑
i∈N
pii. The first-best investment level that maximizes S will be referred
to as I∗:
I∗ = argmax
I
S ≡ argmax
I
pG(I)− (1 + r)I
where I∗ is such that pG′ (I∗) = 1+ r and that the corresponding surplus is positive.9
We characterize equilibrium allocations in terms of the incentive parameter B. As
a starting point, we introduce the threshold value Bz, which defines the lowest level of
incentives compatible with the first-best level of investment:
Bz =
pG (I∗)− (1 + r)I∗
I∗
(2)
Fig.1 identifies Bz using the total surplus hump-shaped curve, S = pG(I) − (1 + r)I,
and straight lines starting from the origin with slope equal to B. Equation (2) implies
that Bz is the slope of the ray that cuts the surplus’ curve at its maximum.
If B = Bz, then for the first-best investment I∗ to be feasible, the (IC) constraint
should bind. From equation (2) it follows that in every economy where B = Bz, whenever
I∗ is implemented, the borrower gets the entire surplus. Lenders’ profits are equal to
zero in the aggregate and the corresponding aggregate repayment will be R∗ such that
pR∗ − (1 + r) I∗ = 0.10
Whenever B > Bz allocations giving zero-profits to the lenders are feasible only if the
level of debt is taken to be lower than I∗.11 We denote this level of aggregate investment
I¯(B):
I¯(B) : pG
(
I¯(B)
)− (1 + r)I¯(B) = BI¯(B),
and I¯(B) < I∗ holds . If, on the contrary, B < Bz, it is then possible to achieve I∗
and to leave some extra-surplus to lenders. One should also notice that for every B < Bz
it would be feasible to implement the first best level of investment I∗ in a monopolistic
environment.
9Inada conditions guarantee the existence of such an I∗.
10This of course implies that every lender earns zero profit, given that their condition is symmetric and
limited liability holds.
11That is, the first-best investment level I∗ does not belong to the feasible set defined by (1).
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of Bz
3.1 Characterization
We first consider the scenario where credit relationships take place under the additional
assumption of exclusive contracting, i.e. the borrower can only accept at most one con-
tract at a time. Thus lenders compete a` la Bertrand over contracts; at equilibrium they
will always receive zero profits and the borrower will appropriate the whole surplus.12
Importantly, competition under exclusivity delivers the first-best level of credit I∗ only
for those economies where incentive problems are very mild (B < Bz). If the incentive
to shirk is high enough, say B ≥ Bz, then zero-profit equilibria will be associated to the
constrained amount of credit I¯(B).
If we allow for non-exclusive contracting, then we formally enter into a common agency
set-up. Given the high degree of externalities involved in the analysis, positive profits
equilibria and low levels of aggregate investment are a typical feature of the analysis. In
our model, we can sustain zero-profit equilibria with competition among lenders offering
non-exclusive contracts for those parameter values which make the moral hazard problem
very mild. As will be clear from the following discussion, equilibria exhibit different
features according to the magnitude of the parameter B relative to the level Bz. To
provide a full description of equilibrium outcomes we also introduce the threshold:
Bc =
pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r)
2I∗
12The mechanism of undercutting on each opponent’s proposal squeezes any possible rent for the lenders.
There cannot be an equilibrium with positive profits for the lenders, given they are all identical and the
entrepreneur chooses only one proposal.
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One should notice that whenever B < Bc < Bz, then the outcome I∗ can be sustained
also in the presence of two lenders. In addition, we let Bm be the minimal incentive level
sufficient to sustain the monopolistic outcome Im:
Im = argmax
I
pim = argmax
I
pG(I)−BI − (1 + r)I.
Hence, if we consider
Bl =
pG (Im)− Im(1 + r)
I∗ + Im
,
then, for every B < Bl < Bz it is feasible to implement the monopolistic outcome even
if the supplementary amount I∗ were offered.
We are now ready to provide a simple characterization of equilibria in terms of the
incentive parameter B.
This is done in the following:
Proposition 1 Whenever B < Bz, then the outcome (R∗, I∗) can be supported as a (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ. In particular:
i) If B ≤ Bc, then (R∗, I∗) is an equilibrium outcome for any N .
ii) If B ∈ (Bc, Bz], then there exists a critical number of lenders NB such that for all
N > NB the aggregate allocation (R∗, I∗) is an equilibrium outcome.
iii) For every B ∈ (Bc, Bl], there exists an equilibrium where only one contract is bought.
The contract guarantees a positive profit to lender i. Furthermore, there is a second
lender who offers a zero profit contract that is not accepted. All other lenders are not
active.
The intuition for the result (i) is the following: consider a scenario where (N − 2)
lenders are not active, while each of the remaining two can offer a contract associated to
a level of debt equal to I∗. Notice that by definition, 2Bc = Bz: this guarantees that two
lenders are enough to sustain the zero-profit equilibrium. If B = Bc, then the borrower
is indifferent between accepting any of the two contracts exerting the desired effort, and
accepting both of them taking zero effort. As long as any single lender k = i, j offers a
contract different from the zero-profit one
(
Rk 6= I
∗(1+r)
p , Ik 6= I∗
)
, a Bertrand argument
applies: the two-lenders competition generates undercutting on each other’s offers until
the marginal cost of funds meets marginal revenues.
One should note that the competitive result emerging in a scenario of exclusivity can
hence be implemented even without imposing exclusivity clauses. If the incentive to shirk
is low, then, despite the high amount of externalities associated to competition under
non-exclusivity, the first best outcome can still be reached.
If the incentive to take the low action falls between Bc and Bz, then zero-profits
equilibria may arise only if N is large enough. This is stated in (ii); in this case, there is
no room for a single lender to offer the contract (R∗, I∗) and trigger the low effort choice.
The borrower will always have an incentive to accept it in conjunction with others zero
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profit contracts and shirk. We hence consider a scenario where all lenders offer the contract
(Ri, Ii), where Ii = I
∗
N−1 and Ri is the repayment level that guarantees zero-profits to the
i-th lender when offering the loan amount I
∗
N−1 , i.e. Ri =
I∗(1+r)
(N−1)p . The borrower accepts
(N − 1) offers and selects e = eH . All active lenders enjoy zero-profit, but they cannot
have an incentive to deviate given the existence of the inactive one. It is then possible
to find a level of N high enough such that this last lender could not profitably deviating
without inducing low effort.
Finally, (iii) identifies a situation where positive profit may emerge even though the
incentive to take low action is relatively small. In such a case, the first-best level of
investment I∗ will be achieved but the distribution of the total surplus will be rather
favorable to the lenders. The equilibrium is sustained by latent contracts, i.e. contracts
which are not bought at equilibrium and are used to deter entry. The analysis of these sort
of equilibria has been introduced in Arnott and Stiglitz (1993) and developed by Hellwig
(1983) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004).
If we consider the case B ≥ Bz, then positive profits equilibria are a general feature
of the analysis. The following proposition provides a full characterization of equilibria in
this region.
Proposition 2 If B ≥ Bz, then no allocation guaranteeing zero-profit for lenders can be
sustained at equilibrium. In addition:
iv) If B ∈ [Bz, Bm), then there is a critical number of lenders NB such that for every
N ≥ NB, there exist a positive profit equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome
(
NR˜,NI˜
)
is
characterized by the following set of equations:
p
[
G
(
NI˜
)
−NR˜
]
= p
[
G
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
− (N − 1)R˜
]
(3)
p
[
G
(
NI˜
)
−NR˜
]
= BNI˜ (4)
and exhibits the feature that:
(N − 1)I˜ > Im (5)
v) If B ≥ Bm, then the monopoly outcome can be supported at equilibrium for any N .
If the incentive problem is relatively strong, given the concavity of the G(.) function,
then any equiproportional reduction in both the repayment and the credit offered by a
single firm satisfies the IC constraint as a strict inequality. Hence, there is room for a
profitable deviation to break any zero-profit equilibrium.
One should also note that (iv) refers to an equilibrium where all the N existing lenders
are active and the borrower is indifferent between accepting (N − 1) or N contracts while
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exerting high effort, as shown by (3). This no-side-contracting condition is crucial to
establish existence of equilibria with positive profits in several works on moral hazard in
insurance economies because it prevents additional purchases of insurance.13 Furthermore,
when the borrower accepts N contracts, her Incentive Compatibility constraint (4) will
bind. Finally, the aggregate level of credit issued by (N − 1) lenders is strictly greater
than Im that corresponds to the investment chosen by one monopolistic lender (5). At
equilibrium, every lender is active in the market, though the aggregate investment level
turns out to be strictly lower than I∗. Competition over financial contracts and moral
hazard determine rationing in credit supply and redistribution towards the intermediation
sector. Whenever B > Bz, we are in the increasing part of the social surplus function
S = pG (I) − (1 + r)I represented in Fig. 1. As a consequence, a single lender i offering
a zero-profit contract can profitably deviate if all the others are playing a zero-profit
strategy: a Bertrand outcome cannot hence be sustained.
Finally, when the moral hazard problem is very relevant, say B ≥ Bm, then any credit
level different from the monopoly one induces shirking.
The main concern of this paper is to characterize the welfare properties of credit market
equilibria when multiple lenders compete over loan contracts. This is the task of the next
section.
4 Welfare analysis
We will provide here a description of the economy’s feasible set, that is the set of players’
payoffs corresponding to the allocations implementable by a social planner. We introduce
the notion of social planner and the related concept of constrained efficiency in the same
way as it is done in the literature on incentives in competitive markets (see for instance
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004)), but we manage to characterize the whole constrained Pareto
frontier. The social planner will choose the aggregate investment level I and the aggregate
repayment R to maximize his preferences over the aggregate feasible set that is usually
denoted as the utility possibility set.
We will henceforth denote piL the payoff earned by lenders in the aggregate credit
sector and pib the corresponding borrower’s payoff. Let us start considering the first-
best situation, where the relevant constraints faced by the planner are those imposed by
technology and resources (together with limited liability requirements). The corresponding
utility possibility set is:
F (piL, pib) =
{
(piL, pib) ∈ R2+ : piL + pib ≤ pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r)
}
(6)
The frontier of the set F is referred to as the first-best Pareto frontier. All the arrays
(piL, pib) belonging to this Pareto frontier are such that there does not exist a pair (pi′L, pi
′
b) ∈
F with pi′L ≥ piL and pi′b > pib or pi′L > piL and pi′b ≥ pib.
13See Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998).
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piL
pib
A
A′
pG (I∗)− (1 + r) I∗
Figure 2: The first-best Pareto frontier
Observe that the payoffs functions piL(R, I) and pib(R, I) evaluated at the high level
of effort are both linear in the aggregate repayment R. As a consequence, the first-best
Pareto frontier will be a downward-sloping 45-degree line. By using the variable pR as a
transfer, we can draw the first-best Pareto frontier pi∗L(pi
∗
b ) as the line depicted in Figure 2.
Every point on the first-best Pareto frontier corresponds to the optimal investment
level I∗. In particular, point A identifies a situation where the whole surplus is distributed
to the borrower, pi∗b = pG (I
∗) − (1 + r)I∗, so that pR = (1 + r)I∗, i.e. pi∗L = 0. If we
consider the opposite case pi∗b = 0, then from (6) we get pR = pG (I
∗), i.e. lenders are
receiving everything and the borrower is left at her reservation utility of zero (point A′).
Let us now define the second-best allocations, i.e. those implementable by a planner
who is facing informational constraints. The constrained utility possibility set is the set of
outcomes (piL, pib) such that:
F ′ (piL, pib) =
{
(piL, pib) ∈ R2+ : piL ≤ pi∗∗L (pi∗∗b , B) , pib ≤ pi∗∗b for every pi∗∗b ∈ [0, pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r)]
}
where for every given pi∗∗b , pi
∗∗
L (pi
∗∗
b , B) is such that:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) = max
R,I
pR− (1 + r)I (7)
s.t.
pR− (1 + r)I + pi∗∗b ≤ pG (I)− (1 + r)I (8)
pi∗∗b ≥ BI (9)
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With respect to the first-best problem, we have introduced here the Incentive Compat-
ibility requirement appearing in equation (9). Observe that for a given pi∗∗b , the lender’s
objective function is monotone in R, hence equation (8) will bind at the optimum. We
can therefore substitute the expression for pR obtained in (8), in the objective function.
The system (7)-(9) can be rewritten as:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) = max
I
pG(I)− pi∗∗b − (1 + r)I (10)
s.t.
pi∗∗b ≥ BI (11)
B Im pG (I∗)− (1 + r) I∗
A
pib
piL
B I∗
Figure 3: The first and second-best Pareto frontiers for B < Bz
One should notice that the constrained utility possibility set and the second-best Pareto
frontier are parameterized to the given incentive structure B. Recall that we defined Bz
as the level of the incentive parameter such that:
pG (I∗)− (1 + r)I∗ = BzI∗
implying that pR = (1 + r)I∗, i.e. lenders make zero profits. Hence,
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∀B < Bz pG (I∗)− (1 + r)I∗ < BI∗
That is, constraint (11) is slack and the first-best is feasible in the second-best problem.
In particular, the point (pi∗∗b , pi
∗∗
L ) = (pG (I
∗)− (1 + r)I∗, 0) belongs to the second-best
Pareto frontier (point A in Figure 3). Hence given B < Bz, there is room to reduce
pi∗∗b without making the constraint (11) binding. There will therefore be an interval of
entrepreneur’s utilities, i.e. pi∗∗b ∈ [BI∗, pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r)], such that the second-best
Pareto frontier pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) coincides with the first-best one pi
∗
L(pi
∗
b ) (Figure 3). By further
reducing the entrepreneur’s payoff we get to pi∗∗b = BI
∗ and pi∗∗L = pG (I
∗)−I∗(1+r)−BI∗.
Every further reduction in pi∗∗b will imply a decrease in the investment level.
If we consider the case B > Bz, equation (11) will always be binding at the optimum
level of investment, hence it is not possible to sustain the first-best investment level I∗.
As a consequence, for every B > Bz the second-best frontier pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) will always lie
below the first-best one, as it is depicted in Figure 4.
piL
B Im
pi∗L (pi
∗
b , B)
pib
A
pG (I∗)− (1 + r) I∗
Figure 4: The second-best Pareto frontier for B > Bz
For the cases of relatively mild incentive problem the second-best frontier has a linear
part, that corresponds to the implementation of the first-best level of investment; whenever
the moral hazard becomes harsher, then the frontier contracts inwards.
No matter the value of B, the highest possible payoff for the lending sector corresponds
to the monopolistic allocation, when the entrepreneur is squeezed to a payoff of pi∗∗b = BIm
and the lenders appropriate all the rest.14 Whenever pi∗∗b < BIm every reduction in pi
∗∗
b
calls for a reduction in pi∗∗L . In the limit the only way to set pi
∗∗
b = 0 is to fix an investment
14Recall that every monopolistic investment depends on the value of the incentive parameter, hence it
should be written Im(B).
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level equal to zero, so that there will not be anything left for the lenders, either. Finally,
we argue that the concavity of G(I) induces a concavity in the second-best Pareto frontier
(Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Lemma 1 Take any B ∈ [0, 1] then for every pi∗∗b ≤ BI∗ the frontier pi∗∗L (pi∗∗b , B) is
a concave curve. In particular, pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) has a maximum in pi
∗∗
b = BIm. For every
pi∗∗b < BIm, pi
∗∗
L (pi
∗∗
b , B) is monotonically increasing.
Proof. If (11) is not binding, we are back to the linear part of the frontier, which
is trivially concave. The interesting case is that of a binding incentive compatibility
constraint (11). Given pi∗∗b and B, then I is uniquely determined and given by I =
pi∗∗b
B .
As a consequence, we get:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) = pG
(
pi∗∗b
B
)
− pi
∗∗
b
B
(1 + r)− pi∗∗b
that is a strictly concave function of pi∗∗b . In particular, for B > Bz the second-best Pareto
frontier is strictly concave.
Defining the constrained Pareto frontier of the economy gives us more intuitions about
the welfare implications of competition over loan contracts. The existence of positive
profits equilibria and some form of rationing in credit markets, where an arbitrarily large
number of homogeneous lenders is competing, turn out to be the by-product of the compet-
itive process itself under asymmetric information. In such circumstances, a planner facing
the same informational constraints as the lenders, cannot implement Pareto-dominant al-
locations with respect to the equilibrium outcomes of the strategic interactions between
N lenders and a single borrower. A formal proof will be provided in the Appendix. Here
we remark that the equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 involve either a competitive
outcome (see (i) and (ii)) where lenders earn zero-profit or the existence of some latent
contracts (iii). It is quite intuitive that the competitive equilibria (i) and (ii) will lie on
the linear part of the frontier (they correspond to point A in Figure 1). The equilibria
with positive profits and latent contracts (iii) fall in the region B < Bz where it is always
possible to sustain the first-best level of investment I∗ together with pi∗∗b > BI
∗. Hence,
the latent contracts are just a device for a different sharing of the surplus. The equi-
librium level of investment would be the same that a social planner would choose when
solving (10)-(11) with a slack incentive compatibility constraint. This equilibrium allo-
cation would correspond to a point on the linear part of the second-best Pareto frontier
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) where it coincides with the first-best one.
The equilibria described in Proposition 2 satisfy the same property. Their crucial
feature turns out to be that they satisfy the (IC) constraint as an equality. As a con-
sequence, to every payoff earned by the entrepreneur/borrower will correspond the same
level of credit issuance, both at equilibrium and at the optimum. That is, the payoff earned
by the lending sector will also be the same. This sustains the (constrained) optimality
result.15
15See Proposition ... in the Appendix.
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we state the following:
Proposition 3 Take a B > Bz and consider the positive profits equilibrium defined in
part (iv) of Proposition 2. Then, if we denote as p˜ib and p˜iL the payoffs earned by the
single borrower and by all the lenders, respectively, we have that the pair (p˜ib, p˜iL) belongs
to the constrained Pareto frontier pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B).
Proof. We first introduce a useful definition. Assume that the borrower earns p˜ib in
the positive-profits equilibrium, we denote p˜iL (p˜ib) the lenders’ payoff induced by p˜ib at
equilibrium.
Let us now take pi∗∗b = p˜ib and construct the equilibrium relationship p˜iL (p˜ib). In the
positive-profits equilibrium defined by (3)-(5) each lender offers the same contract (I˜ , R˜)
and in the aggregate the borrower buys all contracts and exerts high effort. The borrower
is indifferent between accepting N or (N − 1) contracts. Let us call IA the amount of
credit issued and pRA the expected revenues of the lenders. Given that the Incentive
Compatibility constraint is binding in this equilibrium, we then have pi∗∗b = p˜ib = BNI˜,
that implies:
IA =
p˜ib
B
=
pi∗∗b
B
(12)
where we denoted IA = NI˜.
Given the borrower payoff p˜ib and the incentive parameterB, the aggregate investment level
IA that supports p˜ib at equilibrium is uniquely determined. In particular, the Incentive
Compatibility constraint of the equilibrium defines the same level of aggregate investment
of the second-best problem. This investment level IA determines the aggregate surplus of
the economy as:
SA = pG(IA)− (1 + r)IA (13)
and the lenders’ payoff once deduced the borrower’s utility pi∗∗b :
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b ) = S
A − pi∗∗b = pG
(
IA
)− (1 + r)IA −BIA (14)
Notice that the payoff the credit sector earns is strictly positive:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b ) = pR
A − (1 + r)IA > 0 (15)
In particular, the system of equations (12)-(14) identifies a pair (pi∗∗L , pi
∗∗
b ) belonging to the
frontier of the constrained utility possibility set F ′ (pib, piL).
In this simple framework, the main result can be summarized as follows: the common
agency interactions in the market for loans deliver constrained Pareto efficient equilibria,
despite the externalities due to strategic competition over financial contracts. The next
section investigates in greater detail the sources of this finding.
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5 Discussion
We have proposed a simple characterization of the constrained Pareto frontier. At the
optimum, either the first best outcome is implemented, or the Incentive Compatibility
constraint binds as an equality.
The equilibrium outcomes described in Proposition 1 are such that the investment level
I∗ is achieved, whereas those characterized in Proposition 2 imply a binding Incentive
constraint. This is the key to understand the efficiency result: whenever the IC constraint
binds, there is a one-to-one relationship between the entrepreneur payoff and the amount
of credit issued at equilibrium (and at the optimum). As a consequence, the overall payoff
for lenders is determined as well. In particular, the no-side-contracting condition (5) only
serves as a redistributive rule within the lending sector.
In our context, whenever the IC constraint is not binding, there is always room for an
additional lender to offer a profitable contract that will be accepted without inducing the
borrower to select the low effort.
This intuition provides useful insights to further discuss the literature on competitive
markets under asymmetric information. In particular, we can relate our findings to the
studies on competition in insurance and financial markets: Arnott and Stiglitz (1993), Hell-
wig (1983), Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), Bisin and Guaitoli
(2004), and many others. These researches emphasized how asymmetric information in
non-exclusive markets may give rise to the the so-called ”non-price equilibria”, that typ-
ically fail to be (constrained) Pareto efficient. If one modifies the basic description of
the economy so to get a binding Incentive Compatibility constraint at equilibrium, then
efficiency can be reestablished.
Take as an example the recent work of Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), where the inefficient
equilibria are those supported by latent policies. Introducing in this framework a risk-
neutral agent reduces the (endogenous) reservation utility of the low effort at equilibrium
and leads to a binding IC constraint. It is then straightforward to verify the efficiency
property of every equilibrium outcome.16 Even though risk aversion is a natural assump-
tion in insurance models (as the one considered in Bisin and Guaitoli (2004)), most of the
banking literature typically considers risk-neutral entrepreneurs/borrowers.
Our investigation, then, contributes to improve the understanding of the welfare prop-
erties of strategic competition among intermediaries in the presence of a single agent.
Intuition seems to suggest that whenever common agency games with complete informa-
tion are considered, then efficient outcomes can be supported at equilibrium as long as
the Incentive constraint binds.17 INCLUDE SOME COMMENTS ON ELOISA’S
WORK HERE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A BINDING IC
16With reference to Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), if a risk-neutral agent is considered, then their equation
(7) coincides with the IC constraint. In addition, examining equations (8)− (12) that define the planner’s
problem, one can check that the IC binds also at the optimum and that the second best can be decentralized.
17Importantly, we have not restricted in any way participation decisions. That is, our results apply to
the so-called ”delegated” scenario.
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AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A FURTHER EXTERNALITY DUE TO
COURNOT COMPETITION IN MONITORING...
Finally, it is important to remark that our analysis is focused on the simple scenario
where lenders’ strategies are restricted to be take-it or leave-it offers. Investigating the
welfare implications of competition through more complex mechanisms is still a very open
issue. This is a relevant issue for policy issues and will be a major topic in future researches.
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6 Appendix
To show that the results are robust to more general preference structures for the entre-
preneur, in the proofs we will consider the situation in which the entrepreneur’s private
benefit is represented by the non-linear function B(I), which properties have been defined
in Section 2. The specification BI makes the discussion clearer in the paper and turns out
to be unrestrictive.
We hence consider a total private benefit function B(I) that is continuous, increasing
and convex in I:
B(0) = 0, B′(I) > 0, B′′(I) ≥ 0,
and such that the Inada conditions hold:
lim
I→0
B′(I) = 0, and lim
I→∞
B′(I) = +∞.
Everything else remaining unchanged, we now characterize the equilibrium allocations
in terms of the incentive function B(.). More precisely, we introduce the sets Bz, Bc and
Bl corresponding to the parameters Bz, Bc and Bl considered in the text.
Definition 2 We take Bz to be the set of functions B(.) such that:
B (I∗) ≤ pG (I∗)− (1 + r)I∗; (A.1)
Bc is the set of functions B(.) satisfying:
B (2I∗) ≤ pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r); (A.2)
finally, we refer to the set Bl as to the set of B(.) such that:
B (I∗ + Im) ≤ pG (Im)− (1 + r)Im. (A.3)
Under our assumptions on B(.), it holds that if B(.) ∈ Bz then B(.) /∈ Bc.
We now restate the propositions included in the text as relative to the sets of functions
B(.).
Proposition 4 Whenever B /∈ Bz, then the outcome (R∗, I∗) can be supported as a (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the game Γ. In particular,
i) Take any B(.) ∈ Bc, then (R∗, I∗) is an equilibrium outcome for any given N ;
ii) If B(.) ∈ Bz, and B(.) /∈ Bc then there exists a critical number of lenders N¯B s.t. for
all N > N¯B the aggregate allocation (R∗, I∗) is an equilibrium outcome;
iii) For every B(.) ∈ Bl, there exists an equilibrium where only one contract (say, Ci) is
bought. The contract guarantees positive profits to lender i. Furthermore, there is a
second lender (say, lender j) who offers a zero-profit contract that is not accepted.
All other lenders are not active.
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Proof of part (i). We consider the following array of offered contracts:
{(Ri, Ii) = (Rj , Ij) = (R∗, I∗) for i 6= j; (Rk, Ik) = (0, 0) ∀ k 6= i, j} .
That is, there are two lenders, say lender i and lender j who offer the first-best allocation,
while all other lenders are offering the null contract (0, 0). The borrower is indifferent
between accepting the i− th and the j − th contract; given that B(.) ∈ Bc, accepting all
contracts and choosing low action is never a best reply.
In such a scenario, no lender has a profitable deviation given that the first-best outcome
is implemented and the borrower’s profit is maximized.
Proof of part (ii).
Consider the case of B(.) ∈ Bz and B(.) /∈ Bc. If every lender offers the contract
(R′, I ′) =
(
R∗
N−1 ,
I∗
N−1
)
, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to accept (N − 1) out
of N contracts, provided that the high effort is chosen.
By doing so, the first-best aggregate level of investment would be implemented, the
borrower would achieve her maximum expected payoff with each single lender getting zero
profits. Let us evaluate if there exist profitable deviations for lenders.
Given what his opponents offer, lender i can never propose a loan that the borrower
will accept and guarantees herself positive profits. When all j 6= i lenders offer (R′, I ′),
whatever lender i proposes, the borrower can always buy the remaining (N − 1) contracts
and achieve her maximum payoff. Hence, it is a best response for lender i to offer (R′, I ′)
when all other lenders offer (R′, I ′).
Finally, we have to show that the borrower has no incentive to shirk:
pG
(
N − 1
N − 1I
∗
)
− (N − 1)I
∗(1 + r)
N − 1 ≥ B
(
I∗
N
N − 1
)
; (A.4)
that is, we want that the utility she gets from buying all N contracts and exerting low
action be lower than the first-best payoff:
pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r) ≥ B
(
I∗
N
N − 1
)
. (A.5)
As the function B(.) belongs to the set Bz, then it satisfies the condition:
pG (I∗)− I∗(1 + r) ≥ B (I∗) . (16)
Thus, if N is high enough, condition (A.5) is satisfied. Hence, for every B(.) ∈ Bz
and B(.) /∈ Bc and N high enough, the borrower has no incentive to deviate from buying
(N − 1) contracts and choosing high effort. There does not exist any contract for any
lender i that gives him positive profits and is accepted by the borrower. Hence, (R′, I ′)
for each lender, and the borrower accepting (N − 1) contracts and exerting high effort
constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of part (iii).
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Take any B ∈ Bl and consider the function x(I) = pG(I) − I(1 + r) − B (I + I∗); by
continuity there exists an investment level I ′ such that x (I ′) = 0.
The equilibrium is defined by one lender, say lender i, offering the contract Ci = (Ii, Ri)
with Ii = I∗ and Ri s.t. pRi = pG (I∗) − I∗(1 + r) − (pG (I ′)− I ′(1 + r)), hence making
positive profits. A second lender, say lender j offers the zero-profit contract Cj = (Ij , Rj)
such that Ij = I ′ and pRj = (1 + r)I ′. All other lenders k 6= i, j are offering the null
contract Ck = (0, 0). The borrower is accepting Ci, only.
Given the behavior of the other players, lender i must offer the borrower at least a
payoff of pG (I ′) − I ′(1 + r) in order for his contract to be bought. Hence, he has the
incentive to set the investment level at I∗ so to realize the maximum amount of profits
pRi.
Let us now consider lender j: he cannot profitably deviate from the level of investment
Ij = I ′ and be guaranteed that his offer is accepted, without inducing the borrower to
shirk to the low action.
Given the existence of the latent contract j, no contract offering positive investment level
proposed by any of the inactive lenders will be accepted at equilibrium.
Finally, the borrower is indifferent between accepting either contract i or j in isolation
and choosing high effort, and buying both contracts and choosing low action. That is,
accepting i only is a best reply.
To complete the characterization of all relevant equilibria, we need to define the set of
incentive functions related to the implementation of the monopolistic outcome, i.e. Bm.
Definition 3 We refer to Bm as to the set of functions B(.) such that:
B
(
Im + I
′′) ≤ pG(I ′′)− (1 + r)I ′′ (A.6)
where I
′′
= argmax
I
pG (I)− (1 + r)I −B(Im + I).
Proposition 5 If B /∈ Bz, then no allocation guaranteeing zero profits to the lenders can
be sustained at equilibrium. In addition, iv) If B(.) ∈ Bm, then there is a critical number
of lenders NB such that for every N ≥ NB, there exists a positive profit equilibrium. The
equilibrium outcome
(
NR˜,NI˜
)
is characterized by the following set of equations:
p
[
G
(
NI˜
)
−NR˜
]
= p
[
G
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
− (N − 1)R˜
]
(A.7)
p
[
G
(
NI˜
)
−NR˜
]
= B
(
NI˜
)
(A.8)
and exhibits the feature that:
(N − 1)I˜ > Im (A.9)
v) If B /∈ Bm, then the monopoly outcome can be supported at equilibrium for any given
N .
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Proof.
Assume by contradiction that B /∈ Bz and that there exists a zero-profit equilibrium.
At equilibrium, it should be
∑
i
Ii ≤ I¯(B), otherwise the borrower will strictly prefer to
accept all loans and shirk.18 Now, there must be at least two lenders offering a positive
loan amount, otherwise monopoly would be implemented breaking the conjectured zero-
profit equilibrium. Let us call these lenders i and j and let Ii > 0 and Ij > 0 be the
respective amount of loan each of them offers.
It must be that: I¯ − Ij ≥ Ii > 0, and since we conjectured a zero-profit equilibrium
with two strictly positive contractual offers: pG(Ij)− (1 + r)Ij > B(Ij).
Hence, there should exist an ² > 0 such that:
pG(Ij + ²)− (1 + r)(Ij + ²) > B(Ij + ²)
and given we are in the increasing part of the surplus function,
pG(Ij + ²)− (1 + r)(Ij + ²) > pG(Ij) + (1 + r)Ij .
But then, there exists a δ > 0 such that:
pG(Ij + ²)− (1 + r)(Ij + ²)− δ > max {pG(Ij) + (1 + r)Ij , B(Ij + ²)} .
That is, there exists a profitable deviation for lender i when offering (², δ).
Proof of part (iv).
The proof is organized in two steps. First, we show that there is an aggregate contract(
NR˜,NI˜
)
which is a solution of the system (A.7)-(A.8) and satisfies (A.9). In a next
step we show that the strategy profile (Ri, Ii) =
(
R˜, I˜
)
for every lender i ∈ N together
with the borrower decision of accepting all contracts and choosing the high level effort is
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Considering (A.7) and (A.8) together we get:
p
[
G
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
−
(
1− 1
N
)
G
(
NI˜
)]
−
B
(
NI˜
)
N
= 0. (A.10)
We define f (I) = p
[
G ((N − 1)I)− (1− 1N )G(NI)]− B(NI)N .
One should notice that the aggregate investment level belongs to the interval
[
Im, I¯(B)
]
,
where I¯(B) is the level of investment such that
pG
(
I¯(B)
)−B (I¯(B))− (1 + r) I¯(B) = 0
and Im represents the monopolistic level of investment corresponding to the relevantB(.) ∈
Bm. It is easy to check that I¯(B) > Im. Now, let us denote I¯(B)o = I¯(B)N . Evaluating the
function f (I) at I¯(B)o, we obtain:
18Paralleling the discussion in the text, we take I¯(B) to be the credit level that guarantees the full
appropriation of surplus by the borrower, given the incentive structure B.
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f
(
I¯(B)o
)
= pG
(
(N − 1)
N
I¯(B)
)
− pG (I¯(B))+ 1 + r
N
I¯(B). (A.11)
Given that the function G(.) is concave and recalling that pG′
(
I¯(B)
)
> 1+ r, we have
that
pG(I¯(B))− (1 + r)
N
I¯(B) > p
[
G
(
(N − 1)I¯(B)
N
)]
(A.12)
and f
(
I¯(B)o
)
< 0.
Using a similar argument, and recalling the definition of Bm we can check that for
every B ∈ Bm there exist an NB large enough such that ∀N ≥ NB we get:
f
(
Im
N − 1
)
> 0. (A.13)
By continuity of f(.), for every N ≥ NB there exists a value I˜(B,N) such that f
(
I˜
)
= 0.
Given I˜, the value of R satisfying (A.7)-(A.8) can hence be defined in a direct way.
Now, we have to show that at equilibrium every lender will offer the contract
(
R˜, I˜
)
and that the borrower will always have an incentive to accept all contracts and to select
the high action.
Let us start with the borrower’s behavior: if each lender is playing (R˜, I˜), then the bor-
rower’s strategy of acceptingN contracts and exerting high effort is a best reply. Equations
(A.7) and (A.8) guarantee that when
(
NR˜,NI˜
)
is offered in the aggregate, then the bor-
rower cannot deviate by accepting (N − 1) contracts. No reductions in the number of
accepted contracts will be profitable.
Let us consider now the behavior of the lenders. Suppose all (N −1) lenders except lender
i offer
(
R˜, I˜
)
and consider lender i’s best response. Assume lender i offers (Ri, Ii), his
best payoff can be measured with respect to the aggregate amount of loans the borrower
takes up:
pii = pRi − (1 + r)Ii =
= pG
(
kI˜ + Ii
)
− (1 + r)Ii − kpR˜
−max
{
pG
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
− p(N − 1)R˜, B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)}
,
(A.14)
where pii is lender i’s payoff as a function of (Ri, Ii) and k = {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1} is the
number of contracts the borrower buys together with the i-th. On the right hand side
of equation (A.14) we represented the surplus at the aggregate amount of investment(
kI˜ + Ii
)
net of the reimbursements of the k lenders offering
(
R˜, I˜
)
and of the borrower’s
utility. The borrower’s payoff cannot fall below the minimum between the amount she
obtains accepting the (N − 1) contracts and exerting high effort, i.e. pG
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
−
p(N − 1)R˜, and the utility from shirking, i.e. B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)
.
We remark that using equations (A.7) and (A.8), the repayment of each of the (N − 1)
lenders is given by:
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pR˜ = p
[
G
(
NI˜
)
−G
(
(N − 1)I˜
)]
. (A.15)
Now, let us examine the choice of Ii by the i-th principal.
There can be two cases: either Ii ≤ I˜ or Ii > I˜.
In the first case, from the definition of the equilibrium the borrower will have to be
guaranteed at least pG
(
(N − 1)I˜
)
− p(N − 1)R˜ that is greater then B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)
for every Ii ≤ I˜.
In addition, given Ii ≤ I˜ and the concavity of G(.), the borrower will buy all the (N − 1)
contracts together with the i-th. When choosing Ii the lender anticipates how his proposal
affects the entrepreneur’s choice on the number of contracts k she purchases from the
opponents. We show that for every Ii ≤ I˜, the entrepreneur’s payoff is in fact increasing
in k up to k = N − 1. Take the entrepreneur’s payoff in the case she buys kI˜ + Ii and
compare it with buying (N − 1)I˜ + Ii, it’s easy to see that: ∀k = 0, 1, ..., N − 2
pG((N − 1)I˜ + Ii)− p(N − 1)R˜− pRi > pG(kI˜ + Ii)− pkR˜− pRi (A.16)
Hence, the borrower tries to implement an aggregate loan amount of (N − 1)I˜ or NI˜.
This remains true even in the case when Ii > I˜. If lender i chooses to offer Ii > I˜ and the
number of lenders N is sufficiently high, the concavity of G(.) implies that the borrower
selects the number of accepted contracts k from the non-deviating lenders according to
the following condition:
pG′(kI˜ + Ii) ≈ pG(NI˜)− pG((N − 1)I˜)
I˜
≈ pG′((N − 1)I˜) (A.17)
Any increase in Ii must hence be accompanied by a reduction in k. Conditional on
choosing high effort, the previous discussion completely characterizes the borrower’s choice
of k, i.e. her best reply in terms of the number of accepted contracts.19
We remark that whenever Ii > I˜, implementing high effort and choosing the associated k
contracts together with Ii is always dominated by accepting all offers and shirking. That
is, for every Ii > I˜ we have:
B((N − 1)I˜ + Ii) > pG(kI˜ + Ii)− pRi − kpR˜ (A.18)
To show that the inequality (A.18) holds for every possible choice of Ii, consider that
the i-th lender must earn at least what he could earn offering the contract (I˜ , R˜), i.e.
pRi− (1+ r)Ii ≥ pR˜− (1+ r)I˜. Let us take the most favorable case for the borrower, that
is pRi − (1 + r)Ii = pR˜ − (1 + r)I˜. In addition, according to equation (A.17), the choice
of k satisfies kI˜ = (N − 1)I˜ − Ii. We can therefore rewrite the inequality (A.18) as:
B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)
> pG((N − 1))I˜ − pRi −
(
(N − 1)− Ii
I˜
)
pR˜ (A.19)
19Notice that whenever Ii > I˜ the best reply of the borrower is multivalued. She is indifferent between
buying the i-th contract together with k < N − 1 non-deviating ones, and rejecting the offer Ii and
accepting all other offers.
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Since the equilibrium conditions guarantee: B
(
NI˜
)
= pG((N − 1)I˜) − (N − 1)pR˜,
(A.19) can hence be rewritten as:
B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)
−B
(
NI˜
)
> pR˜
Ii
I˜
− (1 + r)Ii (A.20)
which becomes:
B
(
(N − 1)I˜ + Ii
)
−B
(
NI˜
)(
Ii − I˜
)
(
Ii − I˜
) > pG(NI˜)− pG((N − 1)I˜)
I˜
(Ii−I˜)−(1+r)((Ii−I˜))
and, considering derivatives, we get:
B′
(
NI˜
)
+ (1 + r) > pG′(NI˜). (A.22)
Given that B′ (Im) + (1+ r) = pG′(Im) and taking into account the convexity of B(.),
the inequality (A.22) holds.
For every Ii > I˜ equation (A.22) is true, since (N − 1)I˜ > Im. Therefore, whenever
the i-th lender tries to offer a higher amount of loans Ii > I˜ he cannot prevent shirking.
This clarifies that none of the lenders can profitably deviate from the offer (I˜ , R˜).
Proof of (v).
We want to prove that, at equilibrium, there is one lender, say lender i, offering
Ci = (Im, Rm) while the remaining N − 1 ones are offering (0, 0). For lender i, Ci is
clearly a best response, since he attains the maximum available profit. Let us consider if
there exist profitable deviations for any of the non-active N − 1 lender, say lender j. To
have a profitable deviation, lender j should be able to offer some positive amount of loan
Ij > 0 and having his contract accepted either together with the incumbent’s loan Im or
in competition with him.
If Ij is bought together with Im, then the profit the deviating lender could get is given
by:
pij = pG(Im + Ij)− (1 + r)Ij − pRm −B(Im + Ij), (A.23)
where pRm = pG(Im) − B(Im) from the maximization problem of a monopolist. We
can rewrite equation (A.23) as:
pij = pG(Im + Ij)− pG(Im)− (1 + r)Ij − [B(Im + Ij)−B(Im)] . (A.24)
The concavity of G(.) and the convexity of B(.) imply that:
pij < pG
′(Im)Ij− (1+ r)Ij−B(Im+ Ij)+B(Im) < pG′(Im)Ij− (1+ r)Ij−B′(Im)Ij = 0.
(A.25)
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Hence, lender j cannot profitably offer a loan that is taken up together with the i-th
and gives him positive profits. In case lender j tries to compete with the incumbent, the
best he can earn is given by:
pij = pG(Ij)− (1 + r)Ij −B(Im + Ij). (A.26)
Now, the best lender j can do is to offer the amount of investment that solves: pG′(Ij) =
(1+ r)+B′(Im+ Ij). But, given that B(.) /∈ Bm, by doing so the entrepreneur will always
strictly prefer to buy both contracts and shirk. As a consequence, lender j does not have
any profitable deviation from offering (0, 0).
We now analyze welfare properties of equilibria. The features of constrained Pareto
optimal allocations derived in Section 2 naturally extend to a scenario where private
benefits are a non-linear function of the borrowed amount I. First, it is possible to show
that the convexity of the B(I) function preserves the concavity of the Pareto frontier:
Lemma 2 For every pi∗∗b ≤ B (I∗) the second-best Pareto frontier pi∗∗L (pi∗∗b , B) is a concave
curve. In particular, pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) has a maximum in pi
∗∗
b = B (Im). For every pi
∗∗
b < BIm,
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b , B) is monotonically increasing.
Proof.
If pi∗∗b ≤ B (I∗) is not binding, we are back to the linear part of the frontier, which
is trivially concave. The interesting case is that of a binding incentive compatibility
constraint, i.e. pi∗∗b = B (I
∗). Given pi∗∗b and B, then I is uniquely determined and given
by I = B−1 (pi∗∗b ). As a consequence, we get:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b ) = pG
(
B−1 (pi∗∗b )
)− (1 + r)B−1 (pi∗∗b )− pi∗∗b (A.27)
that is a strictly concave function of pi∗∗b :
∂pi∗∗L
∂pi∗∗b
= pG′
(
B−1 (pi∗∗b )
)
B−1 ′ (pi∗∗b )− (1 + r)B−1 ′ (pi∗∗b )− 1 (A.28)
∂2pi∗∗L
∂
(
pi∗∗b
)2 = pG′′ (B−1 (pi∗∗b )) (B−1 ′ (pi∗∗b ))2+pG′ (B−1 (pi∗∗b ))B−1 ′′ (pi∗∗b )−(1+r)B−1 ′′ (pi∗∗b )
(A.29)
Since B′′ ≥ 0, we have B−1 ′′ ≤ 0 and we can conclude that ∂
2pi∗∗L
∂
(
pi∗∗b
)2 ≤ 0.
Then, we argue that the equilibrium outcomes characterized through Proposition 5 and
Proposition 6 identify (constrained) efficient allocations. Importantly, all these equilibria
are such that the relevant (IC) constraint turns out to be binding. One can in fact show
the following:
Proposition 6 Consider any pure strategy equilibrium
[(
Cˆi
)
, (aˆib), p
]
i∈N
of the game Γ.
If the allocation implemented by
[(
Cˆi
)
, (aˆib), p
]
i∈N
induces a binding Incentive Compatibil-
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ity constraint, then the equilibrium outcome is constrained Pareto efficient. In particular,
the equilibrium outcomes
Proof.
Let pˆib be the payoff that the borrower enjoys at equilibrium. We take pˆiL (pˆib) to
be the induced aggregate payoff to lenders. We then consider pi∗∗b = pˆib and construct
the equilibrium relationship pˆiL (pˆib). We also take Iˆ and pˆR to be the amount of credit
issued and the aggregate revenues for lenders, respectively. Given that the Incentive
Compatibility constraint is binding at , we then have pi∗∗b = p˜ib = B(NI˜), that implies:
IA = B−1 (p˜ib) = B−1 (pi∗∗b ) (A.30)
where we denoted IA = NI˜.
Given the borrower payoff p˜ib, the aggregate investment level IA that supports p˜ib at equi-
librium is uniquely determined. In particular, the Incentive Compatibility constraint of
the equilibrium defines the same level of aggregate investment of the second-best problem.
This investment level IA determines the aggregate surplus of the economy as:
SA = pG(IA)− (1 + r)IA (A.31)
and the lenders’ payoff once deduced the borrower’s utility pi∗∗b :
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b ) = S
A − pi∗∗b = pG
(
IA
)− (1 + r)IA −B (IA) (A.33)
Notice that the payoff the credit sector earns is strictly positive:
pi∗∗L (pi
∗∗
b ) = pR
A − (1 + r)IA > 0 (A.34)
In particular, the system of equations (A.30)-(A.33) identifies a pair (pi∗∗L , pi
∗∗
b ) belonging
to the frontier of the constrained utility possibility set F ′ (pib, piL).
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